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GRAIN SALES OF RUSSIA-THE SUMMER OF '72 REVISITE 'D
R. J. CHAR KINS*
ABSTRACT- A review of market conditions and price fluctuations since announcement in 1972 of
large grain sales to Russia indicates that several major questions regarding the impact of those transactions still unresolved. The functioning of international grain trade is delineated and possible effects
on various segments of the United States and world economy are considered.

The grain sales to the Soviet Union from the harvest of
'72 still strikes fear in the hearts of some politicians, anger
or resentment in the hearts of consumers and farmers, and
expressions of wonderment at all the excitement by Agriculture department personnel. The purpose of this paper is
to separate the wheat from the chaff; to discuss, in a systematic manner, the effects of the 1972 transaction on various
groups.
On the morning of July 8, 1972, President Nixon announced the largest agricultural commercial transaction in
recorded history . Following one of the worst crop years in
a decade in the Soviet Union, the U.S. agreed to extend
credit to the U.S.S.R . for Russian purchase of feed grains.
Specifically, the Russians agreed to buy $ 750,000,000
worth of feed grains over a three-year period and guarantee
to take at least $200,000,000 worth in the first year from
August 1, N72, to July, 31, 1973. The Commodities Credit
Corporation (CCC) extended credit with the agreement that
no more tan $500,000,000 worth of grain would be purchased
on credit at any one time. During the crop year 1972-1973
more than 430 million bushels of wheat ( one quarter of total
U.S. production and 36 percent of total wheat exports)
were purchased by the Russians at an average price of $1.63
per bushel, totalling more than $700,000,000.
Wheat and other related prices soared. Cries of corruption, bribery, mismanagement, and conflict of interest were
heard. The result has been paranoia concerning exports of
agricultural products, somewhat unlimiting restrictions on
grain exports, and a new long-term agreement with Russia.
Who was responsible? What was the problem? Who
gained or lost? Was there criminal negligence, or was there
willful and knowledgeable exp)oitation?
This paper summarizes some questions left unanswered
by congressional and justice department investigations.
The groups to be studied are not mutually exclusive.
They are 1) the American consumer, 2) the farmer, 3) the
grain-exporters, 4) the Russian purchasers, 5) the recipients
of wheat through the PL480 program, and 6) the American
taxpayers.
The Consumer. From l July, 1972 to 15 September,
1972, the price of wheat delivered shipboard at U.S. ports
jumped from an average of$ 1.69 per bushel to $2.38 per
bushel. During the same period the food and fuel component of the consumer price index remained relatively constant, going from 124.2 to 124.9. By September of 1973 ,
however, it was up to 136.6, the largest single yearly increase since index records have been kept. More signifi-

cantly, wholesale prices for farm products jumped from 125
in 1972 to 176.3 in 1973.
While there can be no doubt that food prices in general
increased following summer of 1972, the cause and effect
relationship is not quite so clear. When questioned about
the effect of wheat exports on domestic prices, agricultural
officals continously stated that there was little reason for
the price of bread increase since there is a large and widening gap between the price farmers recieve for their wheat
and the retail price of a loaf of bread. In fact, the wheat input makes up only about seven or eight cents of a one
pound loaf of bread. But it is not merely the price of a loaf
of bread that is at stake. Because of a degree of substitutability between hard wheat and feed grains, and because
purchases of corn and other feed grains accompanied
Russian purchases of wheat, the impact of the sale on beef
and all beef and dairy products, pork and pork products,
poultry, etc. must be measured.
Two points need to be made concerning this price
increase:
1) The distributive effects are extremely important. Increases in the price of food are said to be regressive in that
they hit hardest those who can least afford it. If this price
increase were channeled to the farmers, and the subsidy
program could then be eliminated, it would be a step towards elimination of government intervention in the agricultural sector, a move which should please the taxpayers.
But that would exacerbate an already regressive tax structure through an indirect tax on the poor.
2) Price increases as a result of free trade are a shortrun phonomenon which should be viewed in terms of the
well-known long-run gains from trade through the law of
comparative advantage. Unfortunately, short-run losses outweighed by long-run gains are not good politics.
The U.S. Farmer. The major complaint by the
farmers was not that U.S. exporters sold wheat to the
Russians but that the wheat sold at unnecessarily low prices
in view of the world market situation and that farmers
suffered because they missed and opportunity for grain in
1972. Wheat was sold early that year at an artifically low
price due to bad advice from the United Staes Department
of Agriculture (USDA), farmers claimed.
Although serious grain shortfalls were evident in Russia
and in several other countries and exporters had already
sold to Russians more than half the total 1972 U. S. commercial wheat exports, the Wheat Situation Report for
August, 1972, stated:
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'World wheat trade in 1972/73 may rise moderately
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above last season, mainly because of increased import
requirements in Eastern Europe and Russia where 1972
harvests have been reduced by poor weather. Stocks of
the major exporters are down for a second straight year,
but are still ample to meet anticipated needs.'

The August 1972 Demand and Price Situation Report
stated:
'Prices may average around the year earlier level this
season depending on the extent of export shipments to the
U.S. S. R.... The outlook for 1972/73 was brightened by the
recently announced 3 year. $750 million grain agreement with
the U.S. S. R.......... With demand continuing firm, wheat
prices received by farmers this season may average around
the $1.31 per bushel of 1971/72.'

Prices went well above the $1.31 forecast by USDA, and
by the end of the year, the average price received by
farmers was $2.38 per bushel. According to Weldon Barton,
assistant legislative director for the National Farmer's Union
however, farmers had sold the bulk of their crop by July
at the $1.3 I price. His estimate of losses to farmers , entered
into the Congressional Record, follows :
Losses to Farmers

Under the 1970 Agricutural Act, the
farmer should receive 100 percent of parity
on the production from his domestic allotment.
Under the law, payments to the farmer
are actually made at the difference between
the parity .price of wheat on July 1, and the
average market price received by farmers
during the five-month wheat marketing season: July-November.
Parity price of wheat July 1, 1972: 3.02/
bushel.
Average market price received by farmers
$ 1.32
July (actual)
1.51
August (actual)
September (estimated) 1.75
October (estimated)
1.95
November (estimated) 1.95

Total

8.48

$1.70/bushel average for 5 months:
$3.02
-1.70

l .32=payment /bushel
If farmer sold wheat in July (i.e. after the
July 8 announcement of sale to Soviet Union,
but before prices began to rise August 4), and
he received the average of $1.32/bushel:
$ 1.32 payment
+ 1.32 market
2.64/bushel total rece ived by farmer

SJ .02 parity on July I
- 2.64 total received by farmer
.38 loss/bushel

If 400 million bushels sold, 45% of which was
domestic alJotment :
180 million bushels
38 /bushel
$68.40 million loss on wheat certificate
payments
In addition, on the other 220 bushels, the
farmer would forgo the higher prices because
he did not have the information that large
shipments of wheat were involved--and
therefore, that wheat was going up in price.
Assuming that, if the farmer had been
given the information to make judgments in
the marketplace he could have sold this other
56 percent at the 6-month average of $1 .70/
bushel :

$1.70
- 1.32
.38/bushel loss
220 million bushel s
38
$68.4 million loss on wheat certificate
payment
83.6 million loss in the market
152.0 million total loss because market
information was withheld from the
farmer
There are problems with that analysis, which merit
investigation.
Supply and demand analysis concludes that any increase
in demand (given a normal product) will cause an increase in
price . Thus, the "loss" implied by Barton on wheat certificates is a function of the higher price. If any wheat was sold
at the higher price, a "gain" would have to be subtracted
from the "loss".
The implication of both GOA and Barton is that farmers
sold an unusually large proportion of their crops early due
to pessimistic price forecasts by USDA. In fact, as of 1 July ,
1972 , farmers held more than 21 percent of the old crop
on their farms and stilJ had 51 percent of the new crop on
1 October. Both were record percentages. While there is
no doubt that farmers would have received a higher price if
they had been able to hold more of their crops until the
price rose to the end-of-year high of $2.38 per bushel, other
considerations such as storage costs and availability of storage facilities must be taken into account. Two legitimate
questions must be raised:
Do farmers respond to price expectations by withholding
or flooding the market? Indications are that their response
has changed significantly since the summer of 1972.
Did officials in the Department of Agriculture knowingly withhold information in order to hold prices down for
the large grain exporting companies? Conflicting testimony
before the Senate Committee on Government operations
indicates that there was reason for Agriculture to have been
aware that a sizeable grain deal was a strong possibility by
July 3 , 1972. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz,and Assistant
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Secretary Carroll Brunthaver claim that the first information
they had on the wheat sales were on 19 September-- a point
to be examined later.
The Grain Exporters.
Any discussion of the effect of
the grain sales on the exporting companies must begin with
an explanation of the now extinct grain exporting subsidy
program.
U. S. government involvement in the wheat market
began in 1949. It took two forms : a price support program
which allowed domestically sold wheat to vary from $1. 78 to
$2.42 a bushel. Since these prices encouraged wheat production in excess of domestic and international demand, the
government offered a subsidy to wheat exporters-theY. would
sell at some international price below the domestic government supported price and American taxpayers would make
up the difference. For example , if the prevailing U.S . price
were $1.90 a bushel and the international price $1 .40, the
government would pay the exporting companies 50 cents a
bushel. Despite that effort to increase exports, government
owned stocks of wheat continued to grow. In 1964 , the domestic suppo rt price was reduced to $ 1 .30 a bushel and has remained at $1 .25 since 1965. The export subsidy was retained despite the drop in the domestic support price to a
level near the international price.
From October , 1971 , to September 22, 1972 , the target
export price was $1.63 to $1.65 a bushel, based on competing
Canadian prices adjusted for wheat quality and freight
differentials.
The subsidy program was administered by two government
o ffices , the Export Marketing Service (EMS) and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The EMS established
the amount of subsidy as the difference between the Kansas
city daily wheat auction price and the $1.63-$1.65 target
export price. Actual world prices were no longer considered
after October , 1971.
It is estimated that $333,000,000 was paid to those
exporters responsible for sales to Russia. How much of
that total was actu ally in keeping with the state purpose of
making U. S. wheat competitive on the world market is a key
question .
In the late spring and early summer of 1972, the U.S.
stood alone as a major supplier of wheat. Canada and
Australia had both informed the Department of Agriculture
that they would not be capable of any major wheat exports,
and urged the U.S. to raise its export price above the $1.65
level. The department did not, since the CCC held vast
accumulated stores of wheat. There was concern also that
any increase in price would encourage further production and
retard demand.
The registration date was ano ther factor. Since the
amount of the subsidy varied fro111 day to day, and rose as the
domistic price rose, it was to the advantage of exporting
companies to register for the s4bsides on the date when
the subsidy was highest. This was facilitated by a system
which allowed companies to register for a subsidy on any
date regardless of whether they had bought or sold wheat.
There was a penalty if a company didn't sell the amount for
which it had registered within the market year September
through August). It is estimated by the GAO that this
ability to register for subsidy other than the date of sale
cost an additional $1.7 million in subsidies on the
Russi an wheat sales alone. This amounted to an average
extra revenue of 29 .8 cents a bushel. Due to the benefits to
he gained by choosing the right date to register, a type o f
speculative market in subsidy registrations developed .
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Carry-charge increments were involved. Since Canada
and Australia paid the carrying charges such as storage and
insurance for companies which had pruchased wheat for later
export, the Department of Agriculture agreed to pay
American exporters a certain amount so that these charges
would not be passed on to foreign customers. The problem
was that exporters registered for storage at the same time
as they registered for the subsidy. Thus, it was possible
to receive payment for a supposed six-month period when
the wheat had only been stored for two weeks. The
purpose of the carrying charge increment was to make United
States wheat competitive with Canadian and Australian
wheat on the date of sale. fo mostcasesexamined by the GAO,
the combined carrying charge increment plus sibsidy from
registration was higher that the subsidy on the date of the
sales con tract.
The two price system's impact.
The CCC was
pleased to divest itself of unwanted inventory, and the
Russian purchase provided that opportunity. In August,
1972, CCC sold 158.5 million bushels of hard red winter
wheat, more than half of it to those companies exporting to the Russians. On August 31 the CCC sold
wheat to two major exporters,68 million bushels to one and
7 million bushels to another. The CCC price to the first was
3 3/4 cents lower, and to the second 4 3/4 cents lower than
the EMS price upon which the subsidy was paid. The first
company gained a quick $2,400.000, the second gained
$280,000 plus the additional subsidies collected on a price
it had not paid.
The difficulty of deciding how much of the subsidy
actually was used for the intended purpose -- to equalize
the high domestic purchase price with the lower export
sales price -- stems from the impossibility of following
a particular bushel of wheat from purchase to sale.
Wh at is clear, however, is that substantial extra revenue
accured to the exporting companies from mere manipulation
of purchase dates. The senate subcommittee investigations,
as later reported , concluded:
In this era of a seller's market for the
American farmer, then there was no need in
1972 for a wheat (export) subsidy to make
American wheat more competitive in
foreign markets ... Yet the subsidy on
American wheat costing the American
taxpayer more than 300 million dollars in
1972, was continued ...The Subcommittee
finds that the wheat subsidy was a waste
of valuable Federal dollars and an illustration of how Agriculture Department
policy was inadequate, shortsighted and
dictated by outmoded principals and
philosophies ill-equiped for a changed
world.

Further windfall profits were possible for grain
companies. Since the subsidy was based on closing Kansas
City Board of Trade prices, manipulation there could have
been extremely profitable. The Commodity Exchange
Authority (CEA) , a branch of the Department of Agriculture, investigated and found no evidence of manipulation
but the Congressional Subcommittee investigated the investigator, Alex Caldwell, and charged in a 1974 report
that, the CEA concentrated its investigation of specific
trades on the wrong days.
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It was further alleged that the grain companies were
exceeding the speculative limits se.t by the CEA. a follow-up
study by the subcommittee noted in July of 1974,
'The record reflects that reports required
by CEA from the grain companies contained
incorrect information. Reports submitted
by four of the six companies selling grain
to the Russians understated sales commitments.
5

Prosectuion resulted in an agreement from one company
to 'cease and desist' from filing erronous reports, an administrative complaint by CEA against another, and a
critical letter to a third.
It is interesting to note that some administrators move
back and forth from executive positions with large grain
companies to high level positions with the Department of
Agriculture and vice versa. But charges of conflict of interest were found to be insubstantiated by the Justice Department.
The Russian Purchasers. To say that the Russians got
a bargain is un understatement. The average price of
their purchases of United States wheat was $1.63 per
bushel for more than 430 million bushels, while the world
price during the year after their purchases soared to $3.52 on
the Rotterdam market and reached a peak of $6.26 in January of 1974.
In terms of their actual pruchases from the grain
companies, the Russians proved to be skilled exploiters of the
system, purchasing bit by bit from company to company, to
disguise the magnitude of the sale. Russians might well be
eating cheaper bread now than Americans, subsidized by
American taxpayers' dollars .
A related question in what the Russians did with the
wheat. It is not at all clear that all of it was consumed in the
Soviet Union. It is alleged that the Soviet Union bought
United States wheat low, watched the price rise, and then
sold or gave away a far more valuable commodity to present
and potential allies. Whether the grain exporters v.:ere acting
in the interests of United States farmers or Russian buyers
is not known. Representatives Neal Smith, of Iowa, claimed
that the exporters were acting as buying agents for the
Russians. The answer would depend to a great extent on
the price at which the companies purchased wheat sold to
the Soviets, and that information has not been made
available.
The Recipients of Wheat Through PL480. dwindling
grain stocks, it is only normal that those who pay get
wheat and those who don't, don't. In fact, Department of
Agriculture said as much in March of this year:
... the high prices caused the export value
of Government programs to increase in fiscal
1975 to the highest level since 1969, while
the quantity exported in 1975 was about
one-half the 1969 volume.
'Wheat and products generally accounted
for over half the total volume of Governmentprogram exports. Feed grains and products
were the next largest quantity exported,
followed by rice, vegtable oils, dairy products, and cotton. '

So the quantity of exports under PL 480 has declined,
but recipients have had to pay more. Just as importantly,
the percentage of total food aid that is payable with dollars
or other hard currency has increased from 11 percent in
1964 to 80 percent in 1974. This is obviously not a result
of Russian purchases alone, but the effect of the Russian
purchases cannot be neglected.
The American Taxpayer.
An estimate prepared by
the Department of Agriculture concerning the effect of the
Wheat Sales on the United States Treasury is presented
here. The department emphasizes 'Net Savings to the U.S.
Treasury From Sales of Wheat to Russia'.

SAVINGS:
Increased sales proceeds resulting from 50
cents a bushel increase in CCC sales price
on 367 million bushel inventory $184
Annual reduction in storage and interest
costs on 367 million bushels sold from CCC
inventories
Reauction in certificate payments to farmers
becuase of higher prices:
1972 program (535 million bushels at 38
cents each)
1973 program (535 million bushels at 20
cents each)
Reduction in additional set-aside payments
under 1973 wheat program reflecting
lower participation due to higher prices
(7.2 million acres at $27 each)

Amount
(millions)

ADDED COSTS:
Higher exprot payments reflecting increased
quantity exported at higher payment rates.
Shipping subisdy paid U. S. flag vessels
Net savings to U.S. Treasury
GAO note:

73

203
107

195
762

266
~
305
$467

These estimates were taken from
documents prepared by Agriculture and are fro information
only. GOA did not assess the validity
of the representations.
7

Unfortunately, as stated in the note, the 'validity of
the representations' was not assessed and cannot be with the
limited information presented. The document is useful in
pointing to some of the potential costs and savings to the
taxpayers. Some of these are obvious:
Any 'loss' to the farmer in the form of lower certificate
payments must be a 'gain' to the taxpayer.
Any wheat sold by the CCC that was being stored must
decrease storage costs, so there must have been some saving
to taxpayers, resulting from the sales to Russia the increased
price of wheat did bring increased sales proceeds to the CCC .
Reduction in set aside programs saved the Treasury money.
The problem with this analysis, however, is the extent to
which the impacts can be attributed to the Russian wheat
deals. Agriculture can't have it both wa_ys. Either the wheat
sales did have a major impact on the United States economy,
causing wheat prices to rise, or they did not. The claimed
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gains, would have to be backed by much more detailed
analysis before they can be accepted fully. A further saving,
not included, is the amount of grain not financed by the
Treasury for the PL480 program .
The additional costs, however, are a minimum figure.
The higher export payments were extimated more than
$300,000,000 by the Comptoller General's Office. The real
question is not how much the taxpayer saved or lost under
existing programs, but how much could have been saved if
existing programs had been reviewed to determine their
necessity. This theme crops up continually in the reports
and hearings.
The general thrust of this paper is not that U. S. grain
should not have been sold to the Russians. Nor is is being
argued that the short-run inflationary aspects of the sales
were the major problem. Rather, this aspect has set up a
smoke screen which might shield incompetent or crooked
officials. The real question to be asked is who gained and
who lost in the short-run and in the long-run.
•
The consumer's :loss, in the form of higher prices, was
temporary. The overall increase in the consumer price index
can be linked only tenously to the Russian wheat pruchases;
it can be blamed as easily on overall commodity speculation.
From a strictly economic standpoint, free trade of any
kind brings long-run benefits. The major problem is the
short-run distribution concern.
The farmer's 'loss,' if if can be termed as such, was most
probably a short-run, localized situation, ace.ruing mainly to
those farmers whose crops came in early -- Texas, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Illinois and Missouri. This, again, seems to be a
distribution problem.
The real question is whether
officials in the Department of Agriculture know of the grain
sales, knew that prices must rise, and purposely misled
farmers.
As to the grain exporters, whatever their gain, the
questionable legitimacy is moet disturbing. Gains from
exorbitant and unnecessary export subsidies seem clear.
Further gains from manipulation of the closing price or
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early futures pruchases(with knowledge of Russia's intended
purchases) are less clear.
The Russians got a bargain, but whether American
wheat, sold cheaply to the Soviets, went at a dearer price to
other destinations has not been verified.
The large food donationsofthePL480program now seem a
thing of the past, but in I 972, as least, they were linked to the
Russian purchase.
The American taxpayer, through events in the summer
of 1972, said $300,000,000 in unnecessary subsidies. If this
demonstrated that subsidies were no longer needed, it was an
expensive lesson. If the Russian purchase helped raise the
price of wheat and made domestic subsidies unnecessary,
then it was nothing more than a transfer from the consumer
to the taxp:-,yer. Not much more can be said.
The 1972 grain transactions stand out not so much because of their effects on prices, taxes or subsidy programs,but
because of the possibility of large scale wrongdoing that has
never been fully or properly investigated.
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